Land–Air–Land: Ukraine’s offensive against the logistics of the occupied territories enters a new phase

People and territory: the cost of advancement, grey zones and blind spots

According to estimates by the Russian casualties project, based on data from the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the Russian army lost 39,290 personnel in June. This was the highest figure since March 2025 and was 25% above the average monthly losses of the previous five months (31,300 personnel). Some military analysts attribute the increase in losses to changes in infiltration tactics: Russian assault groups are advancing in extremely small units of one or two people to reduce their visibility, but the chances of evacuating wounded personnel in such conditions are close to zero. Another possible explanation is the expansion of the kill zone and the intensification of strikes against rear infrastructure: the likelihood of death is increasing even away from the immediate line of contact. ‘There is no rear anymore’, wrote the Russian Z-channel Rybar.

The scale of losses appears even more stark given that the pace of Russian advances has fallen to its lowest level in two months. According to calculations by deepstat.xyz, based on maps from the Ukrainian-affiliated OSINT project DeepState, Russian forces brought only around 85 square kilometres of Ukrainian territory under firm control in June, and 15 square kilometres in May. This means that each square kilometre captured in June cost more than 460 personnel losses, while the figure for May–June was 730 personnel. During the period of the highest Russian losses of the entire war, from September 2024 to March 2025, when losses averaged 43,000 personnel per month, the Russian army captured around 2,700 square kilometres, meaning approximately 115 personnel losses per kilometre. Thus, at the current stage of the war, the increase in offensive intensity and the corresponding rise in losses, both in personnel and military equipment, have largely ceased to translate into territorial gains.

Figure 1. Russian military personnel losses and territorial gains, 2024–2026

However, the question of the dynamics of territorial gains and losses remains a subject of heated debate. According to calculations by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), 30 square kilometres came under firm Russian control in June, with a further 30 kilometres forming a zone of Russian infiltration. The Russian command presented blatantly false figures claiming that 636 square kilometres came under its control in June, while accusing the Ukrainian side of manipulating the concept of the ‘grey zone’. Russian generals generously count such areas as part of their own zone of control, relying on ‘credit’ flag-planting operations.

At the same time, territorial assessments are indeed becoming increasingly conditional as the kill zone expands, infiltration tactics spread, and sectors of unstable control emerge. Under these conditions, Ukraine’s territorial losses may prove somewhat larger if measured by areas over which Ukraine has lost stable control and which have moved into the ‘grey zone’. However, these losses cannot be equated with Russian gains, since Russia has not established stable control over them. Ukrainian sources, including DeepState, Mashovets and others, acknowledge Russian successes in the second half of June on the Kostyantynivka–Huliaipole axis, but strongly reject Russian claims of almost complete control over Kostyantynivka. These claims are also contradicted by geolocation analysis of photographs taken by Russian troops in the city, examined by ‘The Agency’.

The debate over June’s territorial losses and gains has also introduced the issue of ‘blind spots’, which may become significant in the coming months. This refers to non-geolocated areas of Ukrainian counteroffensive activity. At the end of June, the Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, Oleksandr Syrskyi, stated that the Ukrainian side had managed to move to active operations and liberate 670 square kilometres of territory since the start of the year, without specifying exactly which areas were involved (in March, he claimed that 470 square kilometres had been liberated in the area covered by the southern grouping of Ukrainian forces). Shortly afterwards, the Ukrainian military-affiliated resource DeepState noted that ‘almost none of Ukraine’s successes can yet be shown’, but added: ‘If we take into account how much we regained last month, the enemy will once again end up with a negative figure for the second month in a row’.

French OSINT analyst Clément Molin claims, citing his own sources, that as a result of the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ operations, Ukraine has recaptured approximately 40 square kilometres that had been under Russian control for over a year, whilst a further 40 square kilometres of occupied territory have ended up in a ‘grey zone’. The publication ‘Agency’, citing an expert from the Conflict Intelligence Team (CIT), suggests that the unnamed counteroffensive sector is most likely located along the western border of Donetsk Oblast, north-west of Velyka Novosilka. Ukrainian military expert Oleksandr Kovalenko notes that ‘throughout June, Ukraine’s Defence Forces shared information about their counterattacks only in a very limited manner’ and argues that Russian forces ‘were forced to abandon a number of positions, particularly in the southern operational zone’ (that is, in the Kherson region).

Taken together, these reports may indirectly indicate a thinning of the Russian front line in certain sectors, although Ukraine has so far been unable to fully exploit these opportunities. At the same time, the Rybar Telegram channel, which is close to the Russian Ministry of Defence, and the pro-Kremlin military expert Alexei Leonkov have described such reports as ‘disinformation’ from the Ukrainian command. DeepState analysts, in the statement cited above, advise observers to ‘remain patient’: ‘We expect that in July one of the directions will begin reporting successes’.

Ground-to-air: roads, lorries, bridges

Overall, it can be argued that, amid the continued saturation of low-altitude airspace with drones on both sides, the significance of the concept of the ‘front line’ or ‘line of contact’, as well as the importance of ground offensives as a factor, is declining substantially. At the beginning of June, in a similar review of the month’s military developments, we noted that ground offensives were becoming extremely costly in terms of personnel and equipment losses and would likely stagnate in the future, while the main focus of the campaign was shifting into the air domain. We also argued that Ukraine’s new operational doctrine for counteroffensive action was primarily linked to the theatre of medium-range strikes (→ Re: Russia: Offensive Lockdown). A month earlier, we predicted that the land corridor to Crimea would soon become the hottest front-line zone of the Russia-Ukraine war (→ Re: Russia: Corridor of Opportunity).

Indeed, over the past six weeks, the Ukrainian Armed Forces have succeeded in partially blocking the Novorossiya highway (traffic on the R-280 route from Mariupol to Crimea has fallen by 70%, according to The Economist) and, as a result, partially imposing a lockdown on the peninsula. This has led to the complete failure of the tourist season, partial paralysis of public and private transport, and instability in electricity supplies. As we anticipated, the significant expansion of middle-strike capabilities has meant that the question of territorial control is no longer solely a matter of ground control. At least this remains the case until Russia finds ways to restore parity in low-altitude airspace.

Until that happens, the main trend and key question of the next two months will be whether the logistics crisis spreads from Crimea to Russian-occupied Ukrainian territories more broadly. In this regard, two important and somewhat underestimated trends in June were bridges and trucks: the large-scale loss of Russian freight transport, as well as Ukrainian strikes against bridges in occupied territories.

Against the backdrop of an overall increase in military equipment losses, the scale of Russian losses of transport vehicles is striking (see Figure 2). According to the Ukrainian General Staff, losses reached 12,900 vehicles in June, almost four times the 2025 monthly average (3,300 units). Over the past four months, the increase in vehicle losses has been exponential. Analyst Clément Molin geolocated 784 Russian trucks struck by Ukrainian drones in May–June. Here too, there is evidence of exponential growth: 214 destroyed vehicles were geolocated in May (an average of seven per day), 570 in June (19 per day), and 295 in the final ten days of June alone (29 per day). As a result, transport vehicles, and trucks in particular, may become one of the bottlenecks in Russian logistics for a period of time. Russia as a whole has a substantial number of freight vehicles (around 2.5 million vehicles), and production capacity significantly exceeds current demand. However, mobilising freight transport for the needs of occupied territories and the front may prove to be a logistical challenge.

Figure 2. Losses of military equipment and vehicles by the Russian army, 2024–2026, units

An even more important development in June was the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ campaign against bridges. Since the beginning of the month, at least 26 strikes have been carried out against bridges in occupied territories, including 16 targeting road bridges and 10 targeting rail bridges. Nearly 80% of these attacks hit bridges and crossings linking the peninsula with the mainland, including Chonhar, Henichesk and the Perekop–Armiansk corridor. One of the main targets was the Chonhar Bridge, built in the early 19th century as an alternative to the natural Perekop Isthmus. Ukrainian drones attacked it three times, and after the second strike on 9 June it was at least temporarily rendered inoperable. As a result, the Russian military was forced to establish pontoon crossings and reroute some fuel and ammunition shipments through Armiansk, where they were successfully targeted by Ukrainian forces, explained the commander of the Ukrainian assault regiment, Dmytro (‘Perun’) Filatov.

In addition to Chonhar, the Ukrainian Armed Forces most frequently struck bridges in the Armiansk area, at the Perekop Isthmus. In total, five strikes were carried out against various bridges there, including two attacks on the road bridge near the settlement of Stavky. The bridge across the Henichesk Strait was also attacked three times (8, 15 and 20 June). Furthermore, Ukrainian forces have targeted key bridges within Crimea itself. The bridge near Rozdolne, for example, was attacked three times within five days (18, 22 and 23 June), and was completely destroyed after the third strike.

Ukrainian Armed Forces attacks on bridges and crossings between Crimea and the Kherson region, June–July 2026

Sky and Earth: is a drone offensive possible?

At present, media attention is focused primarily on the effects of Ukraine’s drone offensive on supply routes to Crimea. However, an equally important and natural consequence of this offensive will be a sharp deterioration in supply lines to the occupied territories in Zaporizhzhia and, in particular, Kherson oblasts. At the same time, the systematic targeting of the network of bridges and isthmuses leading to Crimea has effectively blocked an alternative supply corridor, alongside the Novorossiya highway, for the Russian-occupied territories in the south, where Ukrainian sources claim a grouping of more than 150,000 Russian personnel is deployed.

The spokesperson for the Ukrainian Southern Defence Forces, Vladislav Voloshin, stated in mid-June that, as a result of the strikes on the bridges, the number of enemy assaults on the southern sections of the front had decreased. And some Ukrainian experts have directly stated that the main aim of the blockade of Crimea is to cut off supply routes to the southern grouping of Russian troops. Evgeniy Dikiy, a former company commander in the ‘Aidar’ battalion, draws a parallel with the situation in Kherson in 2022, when the blockade on the right bank of the Dniepro forced the then commander of the group, Surovikin, to make a ‘difficult decision’ to withdraw Russian troops from the right bank. ‘What I see now in the Azov region is less about a landing operation and more about a ‘difficult decision’’, he concludes.

There is limited information available about conditions in the occupied part of Kherson oblast, which is in a particularly vulnerable position. In early May, the Ukrainian authorities claimed that the population there was on the brink of a humanitarian catastrophe; this was later confirmed by a UN mission based on a survey of residents. Reports from the local news outlet ‘Bloknot-Kherson’ (in Russian ) indicate that a severe fuel crisis and electricity disruptions have continued for several weeks. On 7 July, the head of the Russian occupation administration in Kherson region, Vladimir Saldo, announced that he was introducing a state of ‘technogenic emergency’ due to a blackout affecting 207 settlements, but soon deleted his post. The Russian leadership is clearly seeking to conceal the true state of affairs.

On 25 June, Volodymyr Zelensky announced the start of a 40-day SBU operation intended to compel Russia to end the war, without explaining what exactly this involved. The OSINT group DeepState, in its summary of June’s military developments, noted that ‘a turning point is emerging in the war, and the further course of events will depend on the actions of the Ukrainian command’. The next six weeks should provide an answer to the key question of military strategy at the current stage of drone warfare: can dominance in low-altitude airspace, aimed at paralysing the enemy’s logistics and supply channels, be translated into a change in the situation on the ground and in the areas under control?